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Preemption of Local Governments'
Authority to Limit Wireless Phone Service
Is a Tough "Cell" Under the
Telecommunications Act
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth'
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's society is on the go, and telecommunication's answer to keeping
up with the busy pace has been the advent of wireless communications systems?
The concept of the American dream is founded in principles of innovation,
determination, and competition; it is embodied in the constant quest to build a
better mouse trap and sell it to the consumer. To sell to consumers, one must
offer the best product at the lowest price. Congress sought to promote these
values by enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"). The stated
purpose of the TCA is "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order
to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.'"
Competition fosters improvements in technology. Wireless phone services
are but one example of such innovation. As the demand for vreless phone
service grows, wireless service providers obtain licenses from the Federal
Communications Commission (CTCC") and apply to local zoning boards for the
right to locate wireless antennae towers within local municipalities. Some local
governing boards are hesitant to allow the necessary facilities because of
aesthetic and safety concerns surrounding the location of the towers.$
1. 176 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999).
2. There are two types of wireless technologies: cellular and personal
communications services ("PCS"). Cellular technology is further divided into digital and
analog. See Lynn Hanley, Wireless Communications and the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. An Experiment in Federalism, 12 LOY. CONSUMERL. REv. 48,49 (1999).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of47
U.S.C.).
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56, pmbl.
(1996). The TCA merely continues the purpose of the Federal Communications Act of
1934, which was enacted in response to AT&T's monopoly in long distance phone
service. See T. Jason Mhite, Tearing Down A Fence That Is Hog Tight, Horse High &
Bull Strong: The Supreme Court Reshapes Jurisdiction of Local Telephone Markets, 11
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 188, 188 (1999) (citing John T. Soma et al., The Essential
Facilities Doctrine in Deregulated Telecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.. 565, 568 (1998) (discussing Telecommunications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1994)).
5. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (Supp. II 1996).
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A debate currently exists as to the scope of land use control rights that
Congress intended to provide local governments.6 The debate centers on
whether Section 332 of the TCA, regulating mobile services, has the effect of
preempting states' rights to exercise police powers of zoning regulations The
power of local zoning governance is limited by Section 332(c)(7)(B).' The
substantive limitations of Section 332(c)(7)(B), the main focus of this Note,
prevent local government from unreasonably discriminating among providers
and from prohibiting the provision of services in decisions regarding the
6. See Leonard Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications
Act of1934: A Federal Regulatory Framework that Is "Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull
Strong", 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 547,587-88 (1998) (asserting that the legislative history of
the 1993 and 1996 Acts indicate that Congress, in enumerating a general authority and
then placing specific limitations on that authority, in effect reduced the power provided
to the states to control local land use). "Although section 332(c)(7)(A) initially appears
to preserve unfettered state regulatory discretion, the long list of exceptions in section
332(c)(7)(B) reveals that the limiting phrase '[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph,'
actually signals a significant shrinking of state regulatory authority. In essence, the
exceptions swallow the grant of authority." Id. But see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458,
at 208 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222 (standing for the general
proposition that Congress intended for states to have the right to favor providers that
better satisfy local interest in visual or aesthetic pleasantness and safety concerns). See
also AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir.
1998) (reasoning that states must have some right to prohibit placement and construction
because if states were required to rubber stamp requests of providers under Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll), which disallows state actions that prohibit provision of services, there
would be no need for Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which requires denials to be in writing
and supported by substantial evidence in a written record).
7. Section 332 of the TCA addresses mobile services and Section 332(c)(7)
specifically outlines a local government's authority to regulate land use within its
borders. Although the Section grants control over the "placement, construction, and
modification of personal wireless service facilities," this is not a complete grant of
general authority. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. H 1996). The power of the local
zoning governance is limited by 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (Supp. 11 1996). The
substantive limitations prevent the local government from unreasonable discrimination
among providers and from prohibition of provision of services in decisions of the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless facilities. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), (H) (Supp. R1 1996). The Section also imposes procedural
requirements on the states or local governments in response to a service provider's
application for construction or placement of such facilities. See 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (Supp. 11 1996). The Section further limits state control by preempting
state power to deny an application "on the basis of environmental effects of radio
emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the [FCC's] regulations
concerning such emissions." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (Supp. I 1996). Lastly, it
allows a cause of action to be brought and heard "on an expedited basis," where the local
government has abused the limited power under the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)
(Supp. H 1996).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (Supp. H1 1996).
[Vol. 66
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placement, construction, and modification of personal vireless facilities? Courts
have addressed claims of unreasonable discrimination and prohibition of
provision of services with a variety of results. Competing interpretations of the
TCA have blurred the function and power of state and local governments in
deciding whether to approve personal wireless service applications for
construction or modification of towers. Sprint Spectnm, L.P. v. Willoth
provides a consumer-centered interpretation of the limitations on local
governments and allows a broader discretion in denial of construction
applications than was previously allowed.
H". FACTS AND HOLDING
The FCC licensed Sprint Spectrum, L.P. ("Sprint") to provide personal
communications services ("PCS") to an area including Ontario, New York.'0
Provision of such services required Sprint to strategically place antennae in
formations called cells" in order to transmit the signals of users within the
calling area. The size of the cell, which determines how closely the antennae
must be arranged, is affected by: (1) whether the signal is digital, as with PCS,
or analog, as with some cellular phones; (2) topography; (3) building density;
and (4) population density." Lucent Technologies13 used these factors to
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
10. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630,634 (2d Cir. 1999).
11. Id
Both PCS and cellular services require the user to be within range of a
wireless telecommunications facility called a cell site. The geographic area
covered by a particular cell site is called a cell, and a provider achieves
seamless coverage throughout a greater area by constructing a grid-pattern of
adjacent honey-comb shaped cells. Each cell site requires antennae and
equipment to provide reliable coverage throughout the cell and to switch the
signal from one cell to the next as a PCS user moves though an area... The
antennae may be placed on preexisting structures .... But absent suitable
preexisting structures within 25[%] of the cell radius, it is necessary to erect
a tower for the antennae.
I&. at 634-35.
12. Id. at 635.
Population density tends to factor into the cell size in two ways: (1) it is a
rough measure of building density and type, and (2) it is also an indicator of
how many telephone users will be located within a cell.... In addition to
signal strength, the limited bandwidth available to PCS providers can
accommodate only a certain number of wireless phone calls within a
particular cell at any one time. Therefore, as phone use within an area
increases, it may become necessary to shrink the cell to ensure that the system
has sufficient capacity to provide reliable service.
Id.
13. Lucent Technologies designed Sprint's PCS system in the area to be served by
20011
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develop guidelines, which indicated proper cell size.'4 Sprint subsequently used
these guidelines to determine that with a population density of 261 per square
mile, Ontario qualified as a suburban, rather than rural, area." A suburban area
required more cell sites to provide service. Consequently, in May 1996, Sprint
made a presentation to local Ontario representatives and proposed a plan to build
three cell sites.' Sprint then filed three applications with the Town Board
("Board") to build 150 foot antennae towers, one in each of the planned cell
sites. 7 The Board scheduled a town meeting and asked Sprint to provide a "Full
Environment Assessment Form ("FEAF") and visual addendum for each
application" so that it could determine if further environmental impact reports"8
were necessary 9 pursuant to New York State law.20
The Board held meetings in August and September of 1996 to discuss
alternative sites and heights of towers and "adopted a resolution 'to declare a
positive environmental impact.'' The resolution indicated that the towers
the FCC license. Id.
14. Id.
Lucent defines a rural morphology as an area in which the population density
is less than 250 people per square mile, and the recommended cell radius is
set at 4 miles. A suburban morphology corresponds to a population density
between 250 and 1778 people per square mile, and a cell radius of 1.5 miles.
... Since Ontario has a population density of approximately 261 per square
mile, it is just within the numerical limits for a suburban morphology
according to Lucent's criteria. The Lucent Technology criteria are only
estimates of use and building size and type, and where the population density
is near the line between two morphologies, the smaller cell and larger number





18. Id. The purpose of these reports is to determine if the proposed actions would
have a significant environmental impact. Id. at 636. If the reports indicate to the Board
that there is a significant consequence to the environment, the Board is required to begin
an Environmental Impact Statement procedure. Id. This procedure has two phases: (1)
DEIS, which is a draft environmental impact statement; and (2) FEIS, which is a final
environmental impact statement. Id. The environmental impact statements aid in
determining the extent of environmental impact and evaluating mitigating actions that
may be taken. Id.
19. Id. (citing Vill. of Westbury v. Dep't of Transp., 549 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (N.Y.
1989); Soc'y of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1038-39
(N.Y. 1991); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 & n.C8-0109:1 (McKinney 1997)
(Background, Purpose and Construction)).
20. State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 8-0101-0117 (McKinney 1997).
21. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 636 (2d Cir. 1999).
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could adversely affect property values in areas surrounding the cell sites.2 There
was also evidence that there might be negative visual and cumulative impacts
from "the proposed facilities and possible future facilities." Sprint submitted
a "visual impact analysis, '24 in February 1997, and a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement ("DEIS"r 5 in May 1997' The Board accepted the DEIS and
submitted the Final Environmental Impact Statement (CTEIS") in August 1997.?
On August 26, 1997, the Board considered Sprint's applications in light of
information provided by Sprint indicating the signals that it would need for
suburban area coverage, the FEIS, and independent data on area coverage of
weaker signals used in neighboring towns. 8 On September 25, 1997, the Board
denied Sprint's applications, concluding that three towers were not necessary
and would be overly intrusive. 9
Sprint initiated an action under the TCA 0 and New York State law"' in the
United States District Court for the Western District of New York challenging
22. Id.
23. Id
24. The visual impact analysis performed by Sprint included balloon tests and
photographic simulations of the proposed sites. Id.
25. The Board submitted this statement in accordance with SEQRA. See supra
note 20.




30. Section 332(c)(7) states:
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority
(A) General Authority
Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit
or affect the authority... thereof over decisions regarding the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or
instrumentality thereof-
(1) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of
functionally equivalent services; and
(I) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision
of personal wireless services.
(iii) Any decision by a State or local government.., to deny a request
to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be..
.supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A), (B)(i) & (iii) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
31. This Note, however, will not address the merits of the New York State law.
See N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101-0117 (McKinney 1997).
2001]
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the Board's denial of its applications.32 The district court granted summary
judgment for the Board.33 Sprint appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit claiming that the Board exceeded its authority by denying
the level of service Sprint deemed necessary, that the Board's decision
unreasonably discriminated against Sprint given that the Board had previously
approved a different provider's application for a tower, and that the denial
constituted a prohibition or had the effect of prohibiting services.35
The Second Circuit found that states could reasonably consider the
proposed location of towers when deciding (1) whether a more probing inquiry
is needed and (2) whether to approve construction applications.36 The court
interpreted the language of the TCA to mean that (1) a local government may
prohibit personal wireless service when service may be provided "by less
intrusive means," (2) a local government may deny applications to build more
towers than are necessary to fill gaps in service, and (3) a local government's
right to deny applications expands once an area is "sufficiently serviced by a
wireless service provider."37 The court held that the ban on prohibiting personal
wireless services extended only to the denial of applications "for a facility using
the least restrictive means to close a significant gap in a user's ability to reach
a cell site that provides access to land-lines." '3
IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The TCA represents Congress's intent to update the Communications Act
of 1934.39 In the field of wireless services, the interest in the promotion of
competition outlined in the preamble of the TCA is tempered by the reservation
of local government's power to control zoning applications for new mobile
service facilities.4° However, the reservation of power is not complete.4'
32. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 996 F. Supp. 253, 259 (W.D.N.Y. 1998),
af'd, 176 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999).
33. Id.
34. It should be noted that the prior approval was for a different form of wireless
technology. The approval was for a cellular provider, rather than a PCS provider such
as Sprint. Id.
35. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1999).
36. Id. at 639.
37. Id. at 643.
38. Id.
39. See Hanley, supra note 2, at 52.
40. "Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or
affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over
decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. II 1996).
41. See Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n of Stratford, 995 F.
Supp. 52, 56 (D. Conn. 1998) (citing BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, Ga.,
[Vol. 66
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Congress placed limitations on the ability of local governments to deny zoning
applications by providing a cause of action against the locality for unreasonable
discrimination and for prohibiting or having the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services.4 Since the enactment of the TCA in
1996, courts have struggled to define what "unreasonable discrimination!'
means and when a state action "prohibit[s] or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting" the
provision of service."
A. Unreasonable Discrimination
In AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach,4 the Fourth
Circuit held that discrimination is not unreasonable when there is no proof that
the local government intended to favor one provider or form of service over
another." In that case, AT&T brought suit against the Virginia Beach City
Council when its application to construct two towers was denied. The towers
were to service one analog and one digital provider each. AT&T sought relief
alleging that the denial was unreasonable discrimination." In addressing the
944 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ga. 1996)). "Although the Act does not 'completely
preempt the authority of state and local governments to make decisions regarding the
placement of wireless communications service facilities within their borders, it does
impose some limitations.'" Id.
42. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), (v) (Supp. 1 1996).
43. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423,426
(4th Cir. 1998); Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Penn Forest Township, 42 F. Supp.
2d 493, 497-98 (M.D. Pa. 1999); Cellco P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of
Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-855 (D. Conn. 1998); Smart, 995 F. Supp. at 57;
Onnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., No. 99CIV.0060(BJS),
1999 WL 494120, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1991).
44. See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P'ship v. Penn Township Butler County, Pa.,
196 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1999); Town of Amherst, N.H. v. Onipoint
Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999); AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d
at 426,429; Penn Forest, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 508; Ceilco, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 184-85; Smart,
995 F. Supp. at 58; Port Auth., 1999 WVL 494120, at *12.
45. 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
46. Id. at 427. The district court relied on Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson
County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1467-68 (N.D. Ala. 1997), which found that actions are
reasonable if the governing body presents a legitimate basis for the denial. AT&T
Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428.
47. See AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 425.
48. AT&T asserted a second claim that the denial of the application violated
Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) because it prohibited the provision of services. Id. at 428.
This claim will be addressed in the next section of this Note. AT&T also alleged
violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) claiming that the city council failed to issue a denial
in writing with substantial evidence to support the decision. Id. at 429. Although the
issue is not important to the arguments expressed in this Note, the court found that there
2001]
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unreasonable discrimination claim, the court relied on a house conference
report, 9 which indicated congressional intent to allow state and local
governments to reasonably consider relative aesthetics and safety of proposed
facilities when granting or denying applications. 0 The court found that the
denial was not intended to favor any one provider or form of service and
therefore could not be considered to be discrimination.51 The court further
concluded that even were the state to discriminate, the drafters of the TCA
intended states to provide different treatment to different services as long as such
treatment was reasonable.52 The court emphasized that zoning is traditionally a
state power, and zoning decisions are traditionally based on aesthetics and
safety; to define such considerations as unreasonable would necessitate that any
denial be deemed unreasonable and would be in violation of the TCA.53 The
court found that this could not have been an intended result of the TCA.54 Thus,
in the Fourth Circuit, disparate treatment does not violate the TCA, as long as it
is reasonable.55 The court did not address what constituted reasonable
discrimination.
In Smart SMR ofNew York, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of Straford 6 the
United States District Court of Connecticut further fleshed out the
reasonableness requirement, providing that a denial is reasonable if there is a
legitimate basis for such denial. Disparate treatment of providers alone does not
provide a cause of action under the reasonability mandate of Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).5 The court found that the proper test for whether a denial of
a zoning application by a local government constitutes unreasonable
discrimination should be whether there is a legitimate basis for the denial. In
that case, the court found that it would have been legitimate to consider visual,
aesthetic, or safety concerns; but that it was unreasonable to deny an application
to modify a tower, rather than construct one, where the legitimate concerns were
minimal. 58
There is, however, an alternative line of cases discussing the test for
unreasonable discrimination. These cases find unreasonable discrimination
whenever there is disparate treatment, rather than evaluating whether a legitimate
was no violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Id.
49. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,222.
50. See AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 427 n.3.





56. 995 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1998).
57. Id. at 59 (citing Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457,
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basis for denial of an application exists. In Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan &
Zoning Commission of Farmington,59 the United States District Court of
Connecticut found that unreasonable discrimination may be found where there
is evidence that the local governance treated providers differently. According
to the court, this occurs when one provider's application is granted and a
subsequent application by a different provider is denied.6' In Cellco, Celco had
applied for a permit to reconstruct a church steeple with six telecommunications
antennae inside.62 Cellco argued that because the commission had approved a
permit for SNET Mobility, a competing provider, the denial of the steeple
application was unreasonable discrimination in violation of the TCA.' The
court applied the disparate treatment test, but found that there was no disparate
treatment where the commission had previously approved an application for a
Cellco business, doing business as Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile.' Because the
commission had approved applications for each of the providers, there was no
indication that the commission favored any provider over Cellco, and the
specific denial did not constitute unreasonable discrimination. Other courts
apply the disparate treatment test finding unreasonable discrimination where
there is evidence that the government intended to favor one provider over
another.6
5
A final alternative view, a hybrid between disparate treatment and
legitimate basis denial, is outlined in BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Parish of
Plaquemines.' In that case, the United States District Court of Louisiana upheld
the disparate treatment test but found that the local government had the right to
deny a permit based on traditional local concerns such as aesthetic appeal and
safetY BellSouth made five applications for towers in the Parish area. All five
59. 3 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Conn. 1998).
60. Id. at 185; see also Gearon & Co. v. Fulton County, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding no discrimination where denial of application appeared to affect
all providers equally); Cellco P'ship v. Hess, No. CIV.A.98-3985, 1999 WVL 178364
(E.D. Pa. March 30, 1999) (holding that disparate treatment is unreasonable
discrimination).
61. Cellco, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
62. Id. at 181.
63. Id. at 185.
64. Id. at 185-86.
65. See, e.g., Nat'l Telecomm. Advisors, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Selectmen of W.
Stockbridge, 27 F. Supp. 2d 284,287 (D. Mass. 1998); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359,374 (D.NJ. 1998), rev'd in part, 197
F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999); Gearon & Co. v. Fulton County, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355 (ND.
Ga. 1998) (finding no discrimination where denial of application appeared to affect all
providers equally).
66. 40 F. Supp. 2d 372 (E.D. La. 1999).
67. Id. at 379-80.
2001]
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towers were necessary to provide reliable service to the area.69 Three
applications were approved.69 BellSouth brought suit contesting the denial of the
remaining two applications claiming that the denials constituted unreasonable
discrimination." The court found that the claim lacked foundation. Specifically,
there was no evidence that the commission favored another provider for the
proposed sites.7 Likewise, there was no evidence that similar structures had
been allowed near the proposed site.72 The court then looked to the
commission's reasons for denying the application and stated that property values
and aesthetic concerns are legitimate reasons for the denial of an application.73
Because there was no disparate treatment and the evidence indicated that the
proposed towers would adversely affect neighboring property values, the court
found that the commission did not unreasonably discriminate against
BellSouth.74
B. Prohibiting Services
In defining when a locality has "prohibited or had the effect of prohibiting
services" in violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(1) of the TCA, most courts have
interpreted Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) to be violated when the principality's
denials result in a blanket prohibition of services.7' For example, in AT&T
68. Id. at 375.
69. Id. at 380.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 381.
73. Id. (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d
423, 427 (4th Cir. 1998)).
74. Id. at 380-81.
75. See, e.g., AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428 (affirming the district court's holding
that Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(l) only applies to "blanket prohibitions" and "general bans
or policies"); Ornnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Penn Forest Township, 42 F. Supp.
2d 493, 499 n.6 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (the test for prohibition is whether there is a general
ban); Cellco P'ship v. Hess, No. CIV.A.98-3935, 1999 WL 178364, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
30, 1999) (citing Flynn v. Burman, 30 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D. Mass. 1998)) (must show
"blanket prohibition or general ban"); BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Parish of Plaquemines,
40 F. Supp. 2d 372, 381 (E.D. La. 1999) ("The denial of a single zoning application
cannot, by itself, amount to a prohibition of cellular services. Subsection (B)(i) only
applies to 'blanket prohibitions,' not individual zoning decisions."); Cellco P'ship v.
Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-85 (D. Conn.
1998) ("[A] zoning commission violates section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) only if it has a
general ban or policy that prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting the provision of
personal wireless services."); Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n of
Stratford, 995 F. Supp. 52, 57 (D. Conn. 1998) ("[T]o prevail under section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll), it must be demonstrated that the Commission has a general policy
against granting special case permits for personal wireless service facilities in residential
[Vol. 66
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Wireless, the Fourth Circuit upheld a decision narrowly interpreting limitations
imposed on states by the TCA 6 Because the section only refers to general bans
on provisions of services and not to individual denials," the Fourth Circuit held
that there was no violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) unless the service
provider could show that the local government had a policy of denying the
provision of wireless services or had denied multiple applications.!' This
decision provides a broad scope for states and their land use controls. Smart
also upheld the "general ban" prohibition as a proper interpretation of Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll). Later that same year, the United States District Court of
Connecticut heard similar arguments in Cellco. The court reiterated that the
denial of an application does not violate Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)1) unless it is
part of a general ban on the provision of personal wireless services.-
The First Circuit addressed the prohibition provision of Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)01) in March 1999. In Town of Amherst, New Hampshire v.
Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc.,"0 the court found that although
one denial did not necessitate a finding that the TCA prohibited or had the effect
of prohibiting, evidence of a general ban was not required.8 ' The court
effectively restricted states land use control because evidence of general policy
or multiple denials of applications was no longer required to find a violation by
the board."' In Amherst, the board denied an application for 190 foot towers.
The board found that shorter towers were an alternative that would allow
Omnipoint to provide service. Omnipoint argued that although the shorter
towers would work, they would not allow providers to share tower space and
would therefore necessitate the building of more towers to provide the same
service. The court found that although the tall towers would be less costly to
Omnipoint and require fewer towers, it was within the board's discretion to favor
the shorter towers, which were more aesthetically pleasing. The court stated that
the TCA reserved to the local governments the power to balance these types of
competing interests. 3
areas.").
76. See AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 431 n.6.
77. Id. at 428-29. The court mentions other district court cases supporting this
view. Id. at 429 (citing Cellco, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 184-85; Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Bd.
of Supervisors of James City County, 984 F. Supp. 966, 971 (E.D. Va. 1998); AT&T
Wireless Services of Fla., Inc. v. Orange County, 982 F. Supp. 856, 860 (N.D. Fla.
1997)).
78. Id. at 428.
79. See Cellco, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
80. 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 14.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 15.
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Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) of the TCA prevents local governing boards from
unreasonably discriminating among providers of functionally equivalent
services." Sprint claimed that the denial of its applications constituted two
forms of unreasonable discrimination under the TCA. First, Sprint argued that
it was discriminatory for the board to require Sprint to endure the expense and
time of the environmental impact studies when such action was not required of
Frontier, a cellular provider whose application to build one analog tower in an
industrial sector of the town was approved. 5 Sprint also argued that the denial
of its applications was discriminatory because it favored Frontier's analog
service and prevented the construction of three PCS towers that Sprint would
need in order to provide competitive coverage.86
Sprint failed to provide evidence that it would not be able to compete with
the analog provider were it not authorized to construct three PCS towers in the
requested locations." The court was unconvinced by the provision of general
information that analog systems have stronger signals and operate on a different
frequency thereby requiring fewer towers to provide service.88 The court found
the evidence insufficient to conclude that discrimination had occurred, and that
even if there were such discrimination, it would not have been unreasonable
under the TCAY9 The court reviewed a house conference report, which defined
"functionally equivalent" service providers as those in direct competition with
one another.90 Utilizing a disparate treatment test, the court found that PCS was
functionally equivalent to analog, so that the board's actions did fit within the
scope of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I). 9' The court concluded, however, that the
house conference report contemplated that discrimination would and should
occur in order to promote development of new technologies that would be more
aesthetically pleasing and less intrusive. The court relied on AT&T Wireless and
concluded that the board's denial of Sprint's applications was a reasonable
action, and therefore, it was not a violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) for the
state to consider the location of the tower in determining whether further inquiry
84. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. 111996).
85. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 638 (2d Cir. 1999). This
is a disparate treatment between providers argument.




90. See id. at 640 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,222).
91. Id. at 638-39.
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was necessary or when deciding whether to approve construction of a new
tower.9
B. Prohibiting Services Claim
Sprint asserted an argument akin to the business judgment rule claiming that
the TCA allows a provider to construct any and all towers the provider deems
necessary to compete effectively with other telecommunications providers,
wireless or not9 3 The board argued that underAT&T Wireless only general bans
are prohibited and because the board had already approved one application, there
was no evidence of a general policy to ban service.' The court determined that
the proper interpretation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) lay somewhere between
those polar opposite assertions.'
The court rejected the business judgment argument, concluding that
although no business would go to the expense of constructing more towers than
would be necessary to effectively compete, the existence of Section
332(c)(7)(B)(iii)" would be absurd if states were not allowed to deny
applications. 7 The court recognized that the TCA sought to balance competing
interests, specifically, the promotion of competition and technology, and the
zoning control of state and local governments.' The court further concluded that
the interests enumerated in the preamble of the TCA should not outweigh the
interests of the states,"° given that Section 332(c)(7)(A) 0' of the TCA preserves
92. Ia at 639 (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155
F.3d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1998)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 640.
95. Id at 641.
96. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (Supp. H 1996) ('Any decision by a State or
local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or
modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by
substantial evidence contained in a written record.").
97. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 639 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428).
98. Id (citing Town of Amherst, N.H. v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc.,
173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999)).
99. See supra text accompanying note 4.
100. See Sprint, 176 F.3d at 639.
101. Section 332(c)(7)(A) provides:
(A) General authority
Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit
or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality
thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and
modification of personal wireless service facilities.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. 11 1996).
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local zoning authority limited only by Section 332(c)(7)(B).' ° The court further
reasoned that requiring states to issue blanket approval would not further the
interests of the TCA. Providers would have no incentive to develop technologies
capable of better service by less intrusive means unless the board was able to
prohibit the more intrusive services. 3
The court also rejected the board's argument that Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)
prohibits only blanket bans of service noting that such a construction would
"simply convert subsection B(i)(ll) into a simple directive to consider
applications on a case-by-case basis."'' Because other provisions of the statute
require local governments to consider each application on a case-by-case basis,
the court found that such an interpretation would render Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll) superfluous and therefore could not be the proper meaning of
the provision. 5 The court supported this conclusion by examining the overall
102. Section 332(c)(7)(B) provides:
(B) Limitations
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or
instrumentality thereof-
(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of
functionally equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision
of personal wireless services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act...
within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed ....
(iii) Any decision... to deny a request to place, construct, or modify
personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by
substantial evidence contained in a written record.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may
regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency
emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's
regulations concerning such emissions.
(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by
a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent
with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act,
commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall
hear and decide such action on an expedited basis....
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (Supp. 111996).
103. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Elizabeth A. Norwicki, Competition in the Local Telecommunications Market: Legislate
or Litigate?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353 (1996)).
104. Id. (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d
423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998)).
105. Id. (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992); Pa. Dep't
of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990); Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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spirit of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v), which requires that claims brought under the
TCA be handled on an expeditious basis."' 5 The court reasoned that if the
general ban interpretation was correct, then absent a local government's express
policy of prohibiting all services, a court would have to wait for multiple denials
by a local government before it could provide a solution."7 A general ban
interpretation hinders providers' ability to bring suit because they would have to
wait and accumulate evidence of a blanket prohibition before they would be able
to prove the board's denial had the effect of prohibiting service. The court found
that this would be contrary to the expeditious basis requirement of Section
332(c)(7)(B)(v).' 08
To discern the proper interpretation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll) the court
set out to define "personal wireless services" with the hope of finding implicit
intent" The court used the definition to find that the proper focus of Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(ll) is on a user's ability in a remote location to access the
national telephone network."0
The Second Circuit then outlined what local government action is
prohibited under Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(n). The court stated that local
governments are prohibited from denying construction applications to fill an
existing gap in service where the least intrusive means are used and the
application does not seek more than the minimum construction required to
provide coverage."' The court then shifted its focus to thepowers of the local
government, finding that where there is no gap in existing coverage, the local
106. Id at 641.
107. Id at 640-41. It is widely held that Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) allows courts to
take action that would not otherwise be a normal course of action in review of zoning
denials; the courts have tended to grant injunctive relief to parties bringing suit under this
Section rather than remanding the case for further consideration by the zoning board. See
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1999); Sprintcom,
Inc. v. Vill. of Mundelein, No. 98C4451, 1999 WL 652032, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20,
1999); Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., No.
99CIV.0060(BJS), 1999 WL 494120, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999) (finding that
although an injunction is the proper form of relief, plaintiff was not entitled to injunction
because it failed to show violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)); Primeco Pets.
Communications, L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1066 (N.D. 111. 1998);
Cellco P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 187
(D. Conn. 1998); United States Cellular Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Des Moines, 589
N.W.2d 712,719 (Iowa 1999) (upholding district court decision not to remand because
it would not be consistent with the expeditious requirements of Section 332).
108. See Sprint, 176 F.3d at 640-41.
109. Id at 641-42.
110. Id. at 642-43. "In other words, local governments must allow service
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government's right to deny applications increases and it may refuse an
application without violating Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)I). 112
Applying these findings to the facts of the case, the court determined that
the applications made by Sprint were not for the least intrusive facilities and
therefore denial of the applications did not violate the TCA.'"
3
V. COMMENT
The scope of unreasonable discrimination provided in Sprint is more
workable than the previous disparate treatment test in that the court focused on
disparate treatment between types of services rather than between providers.
Previous cases stated that unequal treatment could be found where a local
government approved one provider's application but denied another's."4 This
could not have been the intent of Congress in enacting the TCA."' Sprint
explains that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with Section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) under which a local government is not allowed to deny
applications in a way that prohibits the provision of services. The TCA
mandates that local governments approve some service to fill gaps in coverage.
Were disparate treatment among providers the proper test for unreasonable
discrimination, once a local government met its obligation to approve a service
coverage application, any future denial would necessarily result in a violation of
the TCA.
The ruling of Sprint makes the proper definition or test of "unreasonable
discrimination" exceedingly important, as the definition acts as the primary
substantive limitation" 6 of local zoning control over wireless communications
facility locations. The court appears to adopt a hybrid test for unreasonable
112. Id.
113. Id. at 643-44.
114. See, e.g., Cellco P'ship v. Hess, No. CIV.A.98-3985, 1999 WL 178364, at *3-
4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1999); Gearon & Co. v. Fulton County, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355
(N.D. Ga. 1998); Cellco P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 178, 185 (D. Conn. 1998).
115. The preamble to the TCA declares an interest in fostering competition to
provide improvements in technology. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 100 Stat. 56, pmbl. (1996). To do this, there must be a choice between types
of services. If the focus were merely disparate treatment of providers, competition could
be limited to competition between providers of the same type of service. This would not
serve the purpose of development of competing technologies.
116. The two substantive limitations are unreasonable discrimination and
prohibition of services. Under the opinion in Sprint, the unreasonable discrimination test
provides the main restraint on local governments' zoning powers to deny applications for
tower sites. The best chance for a provider to challenge a local government's denial is
now based on unreasonable discrimination because the new interpretation of prohibition
of services allows local governments much more room to deny applications.
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discrimination. After determining that two providers are directly in competition
with one another, the board is obligated to consider whether denial of an
application would result in the denied provider being unable to compete. Upon
determining that cellular and PCS technologies are substantially similar, and
therefore are in direct competition, the board may not deny the less advanced
PCS application if doing so would leave no alternative sites for towers that
would allow the PCS provider to compete. This indicates that local governments
are not allowed to discriminate against different forms of service provision, i.e.,
cellular or PCS. Disparate treatment among different services only violates the
TCA if unreasonable. The court mentioned that local governments were allowed
to discriminate for legitimate reasons such as visual, aesthetic, or safety
concerns. The decision narrowed the powers of the local governments by
allowing disparate treatment between competing services only on a legitimate
basis, thereby broadening the definition of what constitutes unreasonable
discrimination.
The decision makes the unreasonable discrimination prohibition the only
substantive limitation with teeth. Though the Sprint decision restrains the
powers of local governments under the unreasonable discrimination prong, it
reduces the substantive limitation on local governments to "prohibit"
construction and location of towers under Section 332(c)(7XB)(i)(l1). The court
established hurdles to providers' ability to argue a local government has
prohibited services. Under the court's holding, three questions must be
answered in the affirmative before Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(l) applies to local
governments: (1) Is there a gap in service coverage that the application seeks to
fill?; (2) Does the application implement the least intrusive means necessary to
provide service to the area?; and (3) Does the request limit the number of towers
to the minimum necessary to provide service to the area?"" Unless the answer
to all three questions is "yes," the local government cannot be said to have
violated Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(Il).
This means that if there is no gap in service, a local government will be able
to deny applications for tower sites without being said to have prohibited service
under the TCA. The court stressed that the "unreasonable discrimination!'
limitation is always applicable to local governments, so the court did not remove
the substantive limitations imposed by Congress. However, the court also
mentioned that it was not unreasonable to deny a later application if the
structure, placement, or cumulative impact of the site would be more intrusive
than an existing cell. This essentially allows a local government to discriminate
against less technologically advanced PCS providers because they will
necessarily require more sites than an existing cellular site. The only way for a
PCS provider to compensate and effectively compete would be to camouflage
the antennae by placing them in existing structures. This would allow for the
promotion of local visual and aesthetic concerns.
117. See Appendix infra p. 224.
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Where there is a gap in service, the local government still has some control.
A local government is able to deny an application without prohibiting service
where there are less intrusive means".8 or where the application is for more
towers than the minimum necessary to provide service to an area." 9 Although
this is a more narrow reading of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), it allows a bright
line test to be used in evaluating a prohibition claim. The interpretation seems
to favor states rights to zoning control over the competition interest expressed
in the purpose of the TCA. But, close examination reveals that the result allows
for both local control and competition. Although competition is not direct with
the public, it is indirect for the application approval. Service providers must seek
the least intrusive sites and only the minimum number required to provide
service, or their applications will be denied and those of competitors granted.
The public is not faced with the choice between those who provide service in the
least intrusive ways and those who locate towers in unfavorable positions in the
area. Instead, there is a filtration. The public chooses between providers who
clear the first hurdle of competition for the right to locate towers in the area.
Because local boards have more specialized knowledge than the general public,
this will likely result in advancements in less intrusive means of service
technology, while allowing local control of siting facilities until such technology
is developed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sprint interpreted the TCA to balance interests in competition between
service providers and the needs of local residents. The hybrid test, combining
the disparate treatment among services and the legitimate basis test, for
"unreasonable discrimination" is more consumer centered than the provider
focused disparate treatment test. The test does not consider the relationship
between two providers, rather it focuses on the relationship between a provider
and local residents allowing the states to promote more aesthetically pleasing and
less intrusive means of personal wireless service. While the disparate treatment
test focuses on competition of providers, an aim which is annunciated in the
preamble to the TCA, the interpretation given in Sprint better effectuates the goal
of competition and technological advance, while balancing local government's
interest in preserving land use control.
118. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Town of Amherst, N.H. v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 14-15
(1st Cir. 1999) (less intrusive means available where it is possible to shorten the height
of the tower); Gearon & Co. v. Fulton County, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(aesthetic concerns could be mitigated where less sensitive sites are available); Cellco
P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 187 (D.
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The court's interpretation of "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting,"
though in line with the intent of Congress, indicates that the preemption of state
control over land use is more narrow than an initial reading would suggest The
interpretation of "prohibit," like that of "unreasonable discrimination," is also
focused on the consumer. It allows the local governments, elected by the people,
to determine what facilities will exist in their neighborhoods, and is more in line
with the traditional concepts of federalism, reserving a state's ability to control
issues that are normally considered police powers. There is only a preemption
of states rights where there is a gap in service. This ensures that a user in a
remote location has access to the national telephone network. Where the
consumer is able to access the system, a local government cannot be said to be
prohibiting service under Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I1). This interpretation does
not allow service providers to compete with each other for the consumer's
business; rather, providers compete with one another at the application stage
before they are allowed to present a product to the consumer. Allowing local
zoning boards to deny applications where there is already service provided takes
some choice away from the consumer, but the "unreasonable discrimination" ban
ensures that the denials are based on traditional zoning concerns and allows the
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Appendix: Prohibition of Services Test Under Sprint Spectrum
1. Is there a gap in service coverage the application seeks to fill?
IYES 
]
2. Does it implement LocalGc
the least intrusive applicati
means? (B) (f()I I
YES LNO
3. Does it limit the requested
number of towers to the
minimum necessary to provide
service to the area?
YS LNOI
332(c)(7)(B)®(U1) applies and




vernment may deny the
>n without violation of
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